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This paper investigates the effects of the Fed’s balance sheet policy at the zero lower bound on the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent recessions in the United States and Europe in 2008 were characterized by very 
low inﬂation rates (below the target rates), high unemployment rates, low GDP growth, and zero 
nominal interest rates. In response to the economic contraction in the United States, 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) has been utilized. This intervention has increased the size, 
and changed the composition, of the Fed’s balance sheet significantly. In this regard, research 
suggests that the Fed’s program has been effective, with palpable effects on financial conditions 
(e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011; Bhattarai and Neely, 2016).  
Research has also addressed international spillover effects from U.S. unconventional 
monetary policy to advanced and emerging economies (EME) using event studies (Neely, 2015; 
Bowman et al., 2015), GVARs (Chen et al., 2016; Dedola et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017), Qual 
VARs (Tillmann, 2016) or PVARs (Bhattarai et al., 2015). Some studies have also analyzed the 
role of country characteristics and/or different transmissions channels (Bowman et al., 2015; 
Dedola et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017; Mishra et al., 2014b; Ammer et al., 2010). However, 
conclusions in the literature regarding country-specific responses and the role of country policies 
and characteristics are far from established. For example, Bowman et al. (2015) find that financial 
openness, GDP growth, stock market capitalization, and trade openness to the United States are 
affected by fluctuations in U.S. financial variables. However, Anaya et al. (2017) make a case that 
the exchange rate arrangement, the quality of institutions, and the degree of financial openness 
does not play important roles in explaining heterogeneous among the responses from emerging 
countries.  
However, studies that have considered the role of country characteristics examined the 
linkages to either U.S. financial variables or the average impulse responses among EME countries 
or country groups, and therefore, ignored country-specific responses. Additionally, concerned 
about the Fed program, some Asian country has looked for other ways to deal with the impact of 
the Fed balance sheet policy abroad. The use of capital controls, currency interventions, and other 
macroprudential policies are one (Cerutti et al., 2015; Fernández et al., 2016). These policies 
3 
 
affecting country characteristics, may also explain heterogeneous responses among countries. In 
this regard, the question still persists about a detailed empirical analysis of the role of country 
characteristics for the size of spillover effects based on a panel model which facilitates the 
estimation of country-specific responses and compare responses across countries according to 
country policies and characteristics.  
To address this challenge, this paper takes an empirical look at the Fed’s balance sheet policy, 
toward further investigating whether the co-movement in the Fed’s balance sheet has differential 
impacts on the macro and financial variables of emerging Asian countries and the role of country 
characteristics. While a number of papers have analyzed the role of country characteristics, we 
instead focus on the role of domestic capital controls and other macroprudential regulations.  
The empirical model used here is most similar to Pedroni (2013). The advantage of the 
SPVAR model by Pedroni (2013) compared to the frequently applied model of Canova and 
Ciccarelli (2009) seems to reside in the possibility of identifying country-specific responses while 
exploring cross-section responses in the presence of short time-series in order to reduce estimation 
uncertainty. However, our methodology differs from the general specifications in Pedroni (2013) 
which seems suited for analysis of domestic or regional shocks (Mishra et al., 2014a). The most 
notable difference is that the source of common shock affecting panel countries is not indirectly 
inferred by using cross-sectional averages of the country-specific time series, rather it is treated as 
identifiable on the basis of its impacts on other countries. The assumption of a small open economy 
enables for accommodating the interdependencies among countries is induced by linkages to the 
U.S. economy.3 With this idea in mind, our empirical strategy is implemented in two steps. In the 
first step, we use two identification schemes to isolate Fed’s balance sheet shocks in structural 
vector autoregressive setups by means of total assets or term spread as a policy instrument. In the 
second step, we feed the PSVAR with these identified shocks and then examine within a panel 
regression setup the role of country characteristics and policies.  
Our three main findings address the concerns expressed above. First, we find that the time 
series of both identified shocks are mostly expansionary and seem to capture important asset 
                                                            
3 See Hao et al. (2017) for a similar reasoning.  
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purchase policy measures of the Fed during the sample period. Our results also suggest that a 
balance sheet shock leads to an increase in real GDP and prices. This shock also decreases financial 
uncertainty; therefore, increases investor risk appetite. This finding is qualitatively consistent with 
Baumeister and Benati (2013). We argue that the view that emerges from the results of both 
identifications schemes are strikingly different. Second, our estimates from SPVAR confirm the 
existence of strong heterogeneity in country responses of all variables to a positive Fed shock. This 
allows our findings to be only partially consistent with previous works. Finally, we find that 
macroeconomic fundamentals, financial openness, capital controls and intensity of 
macroprudential regulations explain the heterogeneous responses of emerging Asian macro-
financial variables to Fed balance sheet shocks. In particular, we also find that the signiﬁcance of 
these estimates varies across the responsiveness of real credit, long-term government bond yields, 
stock market indices, exchange rate prices and real GDP to Fed shocks.  
This research is broadly complementary to the growing literature examining the impact of 
U.S. monetary policy spillovers to advanced and emerging countries, using the VAR framework 
(Chen et al., 2016; Tillmann, 2016; Bhattarai et al., 2015; Dedola et al., 2017; Anaya et al., 2017). 
More specifically, Bhattarai et al. (2015) also estimate the effects of the Fed program in two steps 
and identify the source of its shock using short-run restrictions. Unlike these studies, this analysis 
compares two sets of identification schemes in which the Fed program are identified using total 
assets and term spread as a policy instrument, respectively. In doing so, our methodology is quite 
similar to the combination of zero and sign restrictions used in Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Weale 
and Wieladek (2016). Second, this research also provides support to the long-run monetary 
neutrality property to distinguish the Fed balance sheet shock from other shocks, assuming that 
country variables are left unchanged in the long-run in response to a Fed shock. Blinder (2010) 
and Chen et al. (2016) explore the role of the term spread as a possible transmission route of U.S. 
unconventional monetary policy. This study is partially complementary to these studies in that 
results from an identified spread shock are only qualitatively similar for some cases in 
identifications scheme I.  
Some related papers that analyze the role of country characteristics include Bowman et al. 
(2015), Georgiadis (2016), Anaya et al. (2017) and Dedola et al. (2017). This research deviates 
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from these studies in that within a panel-data setup, the role of country characteristics is regressed 
to individual country responses within the initial months of the first QE round. A vast number of 
papers examine the impacts on emerging economies’ financial variables, but relatively few tackle 
the empirical macro issues considered here. For example, Anaya et al. (2017) look at the dynamic 
responses of these variables to a U.S. UMP shock with a focus on capital flows as a transmission 
channel and reach the opposite conclusions.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample data. 
Section 3 explains the methodology used to estimate the Fed balance sheet shocks and structural 
panel VAR models. Section 4 presents the results and the robustness checks. Lastly, Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. DATA 
We use monthly data from the United States and eight emerging Asian countries,4 including 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.5 The 
sample period spans 76 months, from September 2008 to December 2014.6 We collected data from 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) (see Appendix A for a list of the indicators). Data for the 
U.S. is taken from the FRED; however, monthly real GDP data for the U.S. is taken from 
Macroeconomic Advisers. We consider one regime during which the federal rate became binding 
at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) conducted 
monetary policy primarily by changing the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet.7  
                                                            
4 We chose the countries following the classification of emerging economies by the Morgan Stanley (MSCI Asia 
Emerging markets).  
5 Table A1 in Appendix contains details of the sources for both the U.S. and emerging Asian economies.  
6 To address the discrepancy in our data we transformed some variables, which originally did not have monthly 
frequency. We use a linear interpolation to increase the frequency to monthly.  
7 See Gilchrist et al. (2015) for more details on the FOMC unconventional monetary policy.  
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Table 1 provides summary statistics for the average values of indicators of country 
characteristics. We consider the following characteristics, split into three categories: 
macroeconomic fundamentals (real GDP growth, inflation, and real credit growth), financial 
openness (financial integration, capital openness, currency exposure, and market capitalization), 
and macroprudential policies (capital regulation, LTV regulations, local and foreign reserve 
requirements, and capital controls). The average value of financial openness related indicators such 
as capital openness, foreign currency exposure, and financial integration are very small for all 
countries compared to Hong Kong and Singapore. From Table 1, we compute the median value of 
each characteristic over the entire sample and then classify each country, depending on whether 
the value of their indicators falls above or below the computed median value.  
Table 2 displays country classifications by indicator and does not show consistent trends 
across countries. For instance, there is not accurate evidence of the relationship between financial 
openness and intensity of macroprudential policy regulation across countries. Further, the intensity 
of capital controls (overall restrictions included capital inflows and outflows) are relatively larger 
in a country with a higher rate of inflation and real GDP growth such India, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
However, this pattern does not provide consistent proof to gauge whether a large intensity of 
capital controls (inflows) affects the responses of countries to Fed balance sheet shocks. To further 
investigate this concern, we regress the point impulse response over a horizon of the 5 months on 
the first value of 5 months of country characteristics. The use of the first month is by construction, 
as this is the long-run restriction of our panel SVAR.  
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Table 1. Average sample values of country characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Country Financial integration 
Capital 
openness 
Currency 
exposure 
Capital 
regulation 
LTV 
regulations
Local reserve 
requirements 
Capital 
controls 
Capital controls 
(inflows) 
Capital controls 
(outflows) 
Hong Kong 22.35 1.00 9.49 0.79 0.51 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 
India 0.72 0.20 0.05 0.16 1.55 -0.12 0.95 0.91 1.00 
Indonesia 0.82 0.50 -0.03 0.32 2.06 2.08 0.66 0.70 0.63 
Korea 1.45 0.60 0.32 0.67 5.20 1.00 0.11 0.13 0.08 
Malaysia 2.50 0.30 0.75 0.32 1.18 -1.11 0.81 0.70 0.92 
Philippines 1.03 0.32 0.08 1.16 -0.96 2.84 0.88 0.75 1.00 
Singapore 15.97 1.00 5.04 0.79 3.45 1.00 0.13 0.10 0.15 
Thailand 1.78 0.20 0.53 0.32 0.05 0.00 0.76 0.67 1.00 
Country Market capitalization Real credit growth Inflation Real GDP growth 
Hong Kong 996.0 0.43 3.6 2.7 
India 73.6 0.79 9.5 7.0 
Indonesia 37.9 1.81 6.0 5.7 
Korea 84.9 0.47 2.7 3.2 
Malaysia 133.8 0.59 4.5 5.2 
Philippines 66.9 3.12 2.55 4.6 
Singapore 232.8 0.45 3.3 4.9 
Thailand 73.8 0.77 2.7 2.9 
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Table 2. Country classifications 
 
              
 
Financial integration Capital openness Foreign currency exposure Capital regulation LTV regulations Local reserve requirements
More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less 
Hong Kong India Hong Kong India Hong Kong India Hong Kong Indonesia India Hong Kong Indonesia Hong Kong
Singapore Indonesia Indonesia Malaysia Malaysia Indonesia India Malaysia Indonesia Malaysia Korea India 
Malaysia Korea Korea Philippines Singapore Korea Korea Thailand Korea Philippines Philippines Malaysia 
Thailand Philippines Singapore Thailand Thailand Philippines Philippines  Singapore Thailand Singapore Thailand 
      Singapore      
Market capitalization Real credit growth Inflation Real GDP growth Capital controls Capital controls (inflows) 
Capital controls 
(outflows) 
More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less 
Hong Kong Indonesia India Hong Kong India 
Hong 
Kong India 
Hong 
Kong Indonesia
Hong 
Kong Indonesia
Hong 
Kong Indonesia
Hong 
Kong 
India Philippines Indonesia Korea Indonesia Korea Indonesia Korea Malaysia India India Korea India Korea 
Korea Thailand Thailand Malaysia Malaysia Philippines Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea Malaysia Singapore Malaysia Singapore
Malaysia   Philippines  Singapore Singapore Philippines Thailand Singapore Philippines  Philippines  
Singapore   Singapore  Thailand     Thailand  Thailand  
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
Our empirical strategy is implemented in two steps. First, we estimate a U.S. structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR) model in which Fed balance sheet shocks (Fed shocks) are identified using 
two identification schemes. Second, we feed the identified shocks in the PSVAR. Finally, we setup 
a panel fixed-effect model in order to analyze the role of country-speciﬁc policies and 
characteristics. 
3.1. Identifying Fed balance sheet shocks 
We use the structural vector autoregressive estimated on monthly data8 as follows:   
𝑦௧ᇱA଴ ൌ ෍ y′୲ିଵA୩ ൅ c ൅
୮
୩ୀଵ
𝜀′௧,     for 1 ൑  𝑡  ൑ 𝑇,                                          ሺ1ሻ 
where 𝑦௧ is an 𝑛 ൈ 1 vector of endogenous variables including the log total asset; the log of CPI; 
the log of real GDP and the log of the level of implied stock market volatility (VIX) at time 𝑡. c  is 
a  1 ൈ 𝑛   vector of parameters. 𝜀′௧ is an 𝑛 ൈ 1  vector of exogenous structural shocks, 𝐴௞ is an 𝑛 ൈ
𝑛  matrix of parameters for 0 ൑ 𝑘 ൑  𝑝 with 𝐴଴ invertible. 𝑝 is the lag length, and 𝑇 is the sample 
size. The SVAR specified in equation ሺ1ሻ can be written as: 
y୲ᇱA଴ ൌ x୲ᇱAା ൅ 𝜀′௧,     for 1 ൑  𝑡  ൑ 𝑇,                                                       ሺ2ሻ 
where Aᇱା ൌ ൣAᇱଵ … Aᇱ୮ 𝑐ᇱ൧ and x୲ᇱ ൌ ൣy୲ିଵᇱ , … , y୲ି୮,ᇱ  1൧ for 1 ൑ 𝑡 ൑ 𝑇.  Their dimensions are 𝑚 ൈ
𝑚 and 𝑚 ൈ 1  with 𝑚 ൌ 𝑛𝑝 ൅ 1 , respectively. The reduced-form VAR associated with the 
structural model specified in equation (2) is:  
y୲ᇱ ൌ x୲ᇱB ൅ u′୲,     for 1 ൑  𝑡  ൑ 𝑇                                                       ሺ3ሻ 
where B ൌ AାA଴ିଵ,    u′୲ ൌ 𝜀௧ᇱA଴ିଵ and Εሾu୲u′୲ሿ ൌ Σ ൌ ሺA଴A′଴ሻିଵ.  B  and Σ  are reduced-form 
parameters, while A଴ and Aା are the structural parameters. Likewise, u′୲  are the reduced-form 
                                                            
8 The baseline VAR is estimated on monthly data using four lags because of the short time-series and a constant using 
the importance sampler approach by Arias, et al. (2018). We also check whether our results are robust for alternative 
setting of the lags (2 and 6) and then find sharply similar results.  
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innovations and 𝜀௧  are the structural shocks. Following the importance sampler approach by Arias 
et al. (2018), we let Θ ൌ  ሺA଴, Aାሻ collect the value of the structural parameters. Formally, given 
Θ of the structural parameters and the data, the structural Fed balance sheet shocks at the time t are 
estimated as:  
𝜀௧ிா஽ሺΘሻ ൌ  y′୲A଴ െ xᇱ୲Aା   for 1 ൑  𝑡  ൑ 𝑇.                                                   ሺ4ሻ 
As one would expect, the structural parameters are not identified and to achieve identification, 
we impose a combination of sign and zero restrictions. To incorporate these restrictions, we employ 
the approach proposed by Arias et al. (2018).9 Motivated by Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Weale 
and Wieladek (2016), we use two different sets of a combination of sign and zero restrictions to 
identify the Fed balance sheet shock as summarized in Table 3. These two sets of restrictions we 
use will be referred to as Identiﬁcations I and II.  
It is well known that the objective of unconventional monetary policy through the asset 
purchase policies, and of monetary policy generally, is to set financial conditions consistent with 
full employment and stable prices. Thus, following Gambacorta et al. (2014), we make an 
assumption of a zero contemporaneous reaction of price and output to Fed balance sheet shocks 
referred to as total asset shocks. However, to distinguish balance sheet shocks from real economy 
disturbance as such aggregates supply and demand shocks, our identification I did not restrict the 
response of total assets to these shocks so that these have an immediate eﬀect on the Fed balance 
sheet. Additionally, since the onset of financial crisis, because the aim of the unconventional 
monetary policy was to undo the economic distortions arising from financial turmoil and disruption, 
our balance sheet shocks would also lead to a decline in the level of implied stock market volatility 
(VIX). More importantly, to disentangle the Fed balance sheet shock from other disturbances, it is 
essential to assume that total assets also rise in response to financial disruptions. Considering this, 
the endogenous response of the central bank balance sheet to financial and economic uncertainty 
responses has a non-negligible advantage (Gertler and Karadi, 2015). That is, the Fed shock can 
be identified as a decline in financial uncertainty and risk, to which monetary policy authorities 
react with a rise in its balance sheets (Weale and Wieladek, 2016).  
                                                            
9 We refer to Arias et al. (2018) for details. 
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Table 3. Identification of Fed balance sheet shocks 
 Total assets Log price Log GDP Log VIX Term spread
Balance sheet 
shock ൐ 0 0 0 0 ൑  
Spread shock  0 0 0 ൑ ൏ 
 
There have been many studies of the international effectiveness of QE, and most consider 
the term spread as the unconventional monetary policy instrument (Blinder, 2010; Chen et al., 
2016). In line with these studies, our Identification II explores the role of term spread as a possible 
transmission route of the Fed balance sheet policy. We assume that both the term spread and 
financial uncertainty fall in response to the Fed balance sheet policy. Moreover, the responses of 
price and output are similar to the identification scheme I. To estimate our models, we follow Arias 
et al. (2018) and use a uniform-normal-inverse-Wishart distribution  over the orthogonal reduced-
form parameterization, characterized by four parameters: UNIWሺν, Φ, Ψ, Ωሻ. We chose the same 
prior density parameterization as in Arias et al. (2018) such that: 𝜈 ൌ 𝑛, Φ ൌ I௡,  Ψ ൌ 0௡,   Ωିଵ ൌ
𝐼௡.   
 
3.2. Panel SVAR model 
As mentioned above, the PSVAR in our analysis differs from the general specification of 
Pedroni (2013) in that we consider a mix of panel time series data and a pure time series data. The 
starting point of our analysis is the reduced-form panel VAR expressed as: 
𝐵௜ሺ𝐿ሻ ∆𝑧௜௧ ൌ 𝜖௜௧,                                                            (5) 
where 𝐵௜ is the coefficient matrix; 𝜖௜,௧ denotes the composite error term. The vector of endogenous 
variables 𝑧௜௧ ൌ ሺ 𝑧ଵ,௜௧, 𝑧ଶ,௧ሻᇱ is a mix of panel times series and pure time series. In other words, 𝑧ଵ,௜௧ 
is a panel variable and 𝑧ଶ,௧ is not a panel variable, but rather a time series variable. This means that 
for 𝑧ଶ,௧ , the cross sectional average is trivially equal to itself. This in return implies that it is 
logically impossible to use it to identify both an idiosyncratic and common shock. Equivalently, 
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using the setup from Pedroni (2013), this accommodates the fact that the loading value for common 
stock in this case is 𝜆௜ ൌ 1 for all 𝑖,  meaning that there is no idiosyncratic component to a Fed 
shock.  
We assume that 𝑧ଵ,௜௧  contains panel variables according to each channel such as the log of 
GDP, log of CPI, 10-year bond yield, log of stock market indices, log of credit to non-financial 
sector, and log of real effective exchange rate and 𝑧ଶ,௧ include only the time series of the Fed shock. 
Note that 𝑧ଵ,௜௧  is demeaned to eliminate country-specific fixed effects. The effect of structural 
shocks (structural impulse responses and the variance decompositions of interest), 𝜖௜௧ , on the 
observed variables is obtained from the structural MA representation in differences  ∆𝑧௜௧ ൌ
𝐵௜ି ଵሺ𝐿ሻ𝜖௜௧ ൌ 𝐴௜ሺ𝐿ሻ𝜖௜௧ where 𝜖௜௧ ൌ ሺ 𝜖௧, 𝜖௜௧ሻᇱ are structurally identified shocks corresponding to a 
fed balance sheet shock, 𝜖௧ and country-specific shocks 𝜖௜௧. The effect of a structural shock, 𝜖௧ on 
countries variables is the cumulative sum of its effects on these variables. The long-run cumulative 
effects are summarized by the matrixA௜ሺLሻ ൌ ∑ 𝐴௜,௦ொ೔௦ୀ଴ 𝐿௦. Here, the identifying restrictions are 
imposed in terms of the steady-state restrictions on A௜, which can be represented succinctly as 
𝐴ሺ1ሻ௜,௝ ൌ 0, where  A௜ሺ1ሻ ൌ limொ೔→ஶ ∑ 𝐴௜,௦ொ೔௦ୀ଴ 𝐿௦  is the steady-state responses of the log levels 
𝑧௜௧ to the structural shocks 𝜖௜௧.  In our baseline model, the long-run restriction is imposed on 
variables which are assumed to be 𝐼ሺ1ሻ, because otherwise no structural shock can have a nonzero 
long-run effect on a stationary variable. 
More importantly, 𝐴ሺ1ሻ௜,௝ ൌ 0 is implemented according to macro and financial blocks, 
respectively.10 As noted above, we assume that the steady-state values for both macro and financial 
variables are invariants to the Fed’s shocks. In other words, the Fed balance sheet shock has a 
transitory effect on the equilibrium of panel variables, but no long-run effect. In particular, 
𝐴ሺ1ሻଵ,ଷ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଶ,ଷ ൌ 0 indicate that Fed shocks has no long-run effects on Asian macro variables 
such as real GDP and CPI. Yet, 𝐴ሺ1ሻଵ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଶ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଷ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻସ,ହ ൌ 0 indicates that the 
steady-state values for credit to private sectors, real exchange rate, long-run government bond and 
stock price are invariants to the Fed’s shocks. As mentioned above, common stock is not inferred 
                                                            
10 To avoid the identification problem, we consider one block at time. Thus we identify the parameters in the matrix 
𝐴ሺ1ሻ௜,௝ as 𝐴ሺ1ሻଵ,ଷ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଶ,ଷ ൌ 0 and 𝐴ሺ1ሻଵ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଶ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻଷ,ହ ൌ 𝐴ሺ1ሻସ,ହ ൌ 0 in the first and second block, 
respectevely.  
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by using cross-sectional averages of the country-specific time series, rather it is identified in our 
first step via their impact on U.S. time series data.  
Here the long-run identification scheme proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) is chosen 
because it appears to place less reliance on country-specific information (Mishra et al., 2014a). We 
believe that if so, the assumption about both macro and financial responses and the speed of 
information flows could likely be heterogeneous among emerging Asian countries. Moreover, one 
may argue that the Fed policy’s spillover effects may be long lasting compared to our restriction 
schemes. We agree that Fed shocks may well have such long-run spillover effects. However, we 
also believe that these effects are temporary because of the temporary flow effects on liquidity 
premia and other factors such as domestic policies.  
Lastly, we also generate the confidence bands (25th and 75th percentiles) around the spatial 
individual country quantile in order to examine whether some subset of emerging Asian countries 
responds heterogeneously to Fed shocks.11  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, our results are presented in three steps. First, we discuss the results of the 
estimated Fed balance sheet shocks, and then present the responses from the estimated U.S. 
structural VAR model. Second, we present the impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions from the estimated baseline structural PVAR models. We also discuss the implied 
share of the distributional responses and variances attributable to a Fed balance sheet shock. Finally, 
we discuss the results of estimated panel fixed-effect regressions, exploring the role of country 
policies and characteristics.  
4.1. Fed balance sheet shocks 
Figure 1 documents the posterior medians of the structural Fed balance sheet shocks, 
reflecting the standard deviations of the innovations. Note that our Identiﬁcations I and II are quite 
                                                            
11 We refer the readers to Pedroni (2013) for further details.  
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similar in spirit to the combination of zero and sign restrictions used in Boeckx et al. (2017) in 
order to identify unconventional monetary policy shocks. Their study defines the sum of the shocks 
as zero over the whole sample period. In doing so, a rise in the shock series implies an expansionary 
balance sheet shock, whereas a decline reﬂects a tightening of the balance sheet relative to the 
average endogenous response to other economic distortions arising from price and wage stickiness, 
credit market frictions, monopolistic competition and the like.  
For all rounds and operations (QE1, QE2, OP Twist and QE3), their starts are identiﬁed as 
expansionary balance sheet shocks, implying that our identification strategies II and I are plausible. 
Under each round, the expansionary balance sheet shock interpreted as an unexpected component 
Fed decisions regarding asset purchases depend critically on which assets are purchased and its 
objectives. For instance, asset purchase programs on November 25, 2008, and March 2010 in QE1 
are captured by our identified shocks; that is, the expansionary shocks which aimed at supporting 
directly the housing market. Expansionary shocks in QE2, in which the Fed purchased only 
Treasuries, aimed to ensure that inflation is at levels consistent with its mandate. Further, the 
Operation Twist, mainly the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) and Reinvestment Policy were 
introduced in order to twist yield curve in response to the onset of recession and spike in the 
financial stress index. Our identified shocks capture the start of these operations. Moreover, 
expansionary shocks in the third round reflected the extension of Operation Twist and policy 
introduced in response to labor market contraction. As most monetary policy decisions are 
announced before they are implemented, over the sample period, one would expect some 
expansionary shocks to occur after the date of the announcements (Fratzscher et al., 2013). 
However, regarding the spread shock, we identify the unexpected change in term spread 
innovations differ from the total asset shock in some ways and resemble them in others. The most 
notable difference is the timing and size of shocks. 
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Figure 1. Dynamic of the identification of Fed balance sheet shocks 
                   (a) Identification I 
 
                        (b) Identification II 
  
Notes: The figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the estimated Fed balance sheet shocks, reflecting the unexpected change of the 
total assets and term spread, respectively. The shadow area (in dark grey) shows 68% posterior credibility set. The 
shadow areas (in light grey) show the round of assets purchases program, QE1, QE2 and QE3 respectively.  
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4.2. The domestic effects of Fed balance sheet shocks 
Figure 2 shows the point-wise median as well as the 68 percent equal-tailed point-wise 
probability bands for the impulse response functions for GDP, CPI, VIX and monetary instrument. 
It indeed displays the responses of one standard deviation Fed's balance sheet shocks, 
corresponding to Identification I and II. Under Identification I, total assets rise on impact, and VIX 
decrease on impact; GDP and CPI do no change on impact. This is by construction as they are the 
restrictions. Qualitatively, the results show that both CPI and GDP rise in response to an asset 
purchases shock. More importantly, results are consistent with the view that unconventional 
monetary policy under asset purchase programs lead to a decline in financial uncertainty. These 
effects are statistically significant.  
Consistent with previous works, we consider VIX as a measure of financial uncertainty and 
risk appetite (Bekaert et al., 2013) in that its decline reflects a change in the risk-taking channel of 
monetary policy. Our results are consistent with previous findings (Baumeister and Benati, 2013; 
Weale and Wieladek, 2016). However, the magnitude of our responses are small and differ 
strikingly from previous studies, meaning that the underlying quantitative differences can arise as 
a result of the identification schemes or data in which the model was estimated. However, under 
identification II, the term spread and VIX decline on impact and GDP and CPI do no change on 
impact. Similar to previous findings, CPI and GDP rise in response to the spread of shocks trough 
the decline in term spread and financial uncertainty. These results are consistent with the idea that 
the long-term Treasury bond yields played a demonstrable role in the transmission of the Fed’s 
asset purchase program to the real economy. Our findings support previous works that use the 
spread shock to distinguish unconventional monetary policy from other disturbances. We further 
analyze the international role of a shock to term spread below.  
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Figure 2. Dynamic effects of Fed Balance sheet shocks in the U.S. economy 
(a) Identification I 
 
(b) Identification II 
 
Notes: Responses to a one standard deviation Fed's balance sheet shock (Total assets and term spread shocks). The 
solid curves represent the point-wise posterior medians, and the shaded areas represent the 68 percent equal-tailed 
point-wise probability bands. 10. 000 independent draws were used to generate the responses.  
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We conduct a robustness check by considering an alternative specification for the choice of 
lag, the set of variables included in the VAR, and the change in the sample period. First, the 
alternative setting of the lag (2 and 6) yield results very similar to those initially reported. Second, 
we use IP instead of GDP, use BBB-AAA corporate bond spread instead of VIX, and use of CPE 
instead of CPI. The results suggest that these changes make only a slight difference on our results. 
Third, we use a sample ending in September 2013, prior to the tapering announcement, which 
shows that results are not driven by the pattern of that period. We report results of robustness 
checks in the Appendix.  
 
4.3. Spillover effects of Fed balance sheet shocks 
We first examine the unit root test and the cross-sectional dependence (CD) across 
countries.12 Our results suggest that there is a cross-sectional dependency of time-series data 
among emerging Asian countries. Further, all variables are non-stationary at level and become 
stationary at first difference.13 This allows the use of the long-run identifying restricted panel VAR 
because this restriction requires that the individual data follow a unit root process (Blanchard and 
Quah, 1989; Pedroni, 2013).  
 
4.4. Impulse responses and variance decomposition 
In this subsection, we report the medians as well as the 25th and 75th percentiles as the error 
bands for the impulse response functions (IRFs) and dynamic variance decompositions (VD) of 
the endogenous variables of the panel SVAR. As one would expect, under Identification I and II, 
the results from 25th and 75th percent quantile responses and its share of the total forecast variances 
attest to the existence of substantial heterogeneity across countries to a positive Fed shock. We 
present the results in Appendix A.   
                                                            
12 We use the Stata routine XTCD for the CD test, and MULTIPURT for the panel unit root tests for multiple variables 
and lags. 
13 The results of the unit root test and cross-sectional dependence are available upon request.  
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4.5. Robustness analysis  
We conduct a robustness check by considering an alternative specification for the set of 
variables included in the panel SVAR model. For both blocks, we add the new variable VIX. The 
motivation behind this approach is that its response to a Fed balance sheet shock should help 
evaluate whether monetary shock is correctly identified. The results reported in Appendix B are 
qualitatively similar to those of the baseline specification. In particular, as one would expect, VIX 
declines following Fed shocks.  
 
4.6. The cross-country distribution of the effects of Fed balance sheet shocks 
Figures 3 and 4 report the values for each variable and country, the distributional 
characteristics of values over the 5-month horizon of median responses to a Fed Balance sheet 
shock and their respective variance decomposition. We consider only the response and variance 
decomposition of our baseline identification scheme, referred to as Identification I. As displayed 
in Figure 3, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries in terms of the magnitude and sign 
of the estimated effect of Fed shocks.  
With respect to the response of prices to a Fed balance sheet shock, the effects are small and 
vary considerably across countries, with the largest effect evident for Singapore. Prices fall slightly 
in Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. However, they tend to rise moderately in India and Malaysia. 
Excluding Singapore and Hong Kong, a Fed balance sheet shock seems to have large and negative 
effects on real GDP, with the largest decline present in Thailand. However, the difference in the 
shape of the distributional characteristics of each country’s responses shows a heterogeneous 
pattern across horizons.  
Among financial variables, the peak median response of the real exchange rate is positive 
but small; that is, most countries experience an appreciation of exchange rate. The largest 
appreciation occurred in Indonesia. However, other countries such as Korea, Singapore, and 
Thailand experience negative effects. With respect to the response of the stock market index, the 
estimated effects also vary substantially across countries and horizons. Only countries including 
India, Philippines, and Singapore experience an increase in stock markets. Except for Hong Kong, 
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the sign of the peak response of long-run interest rate is similar across countries. Thus, the long-
run interest rate rises in most countries; the largest increase takes place in Indonesia. Moreover, 
the real credit declines moderately in most countries; however, countries like Indonesia and 
Singapore experience a small increase in real credit.  
With respect to the cross-country distribution of the variance decomposition of financial and 
macro variables, Figure 4 displays substantial heterogeneity across countries in terms of the 
magnitude and horizons of the estimated effects of Fed balance sheet shocks. To understand what 
drives the heterogeneity in emerging Asian macro and financial variables’ responses, we propose 
below a panel-data setup with country-specific variables.  
 
4.7. Country characteristics and the effects of Fed balance sheet shocks  
What could account for this discrepancy across countries? In order to understand that, we 
propose a panel fixed-effect setup with country-specific variables. In other words, the point 
impulse response over a horizon of the 5 months is regressed on the first value of 5 months of 
country characteristics during QE1. We compute the fixed-effects regression of the form: 
𝑍௜௧ ൌ 𝛼௜ ൅ 𝛾௧ ൅ 𝛽𝑋௜௧ ൅ 𝜖௜௧,                                                     (6) 
where 𝑍௜௧ denotes the point impulse response of country 𝑖 at month 𝑡.  𝑋௜௧   represents country-
specific variables for the same country-month pair, and 𝜖௜௧ represents an error term. The variable 
𝛼௜ denotes country-specific fixed effects, controlling for time-invariant country characteristics. 
𝛾௧ denotes time fixed-effects, controlling for aggregate factors that may have affected 𝑍  at 
particular points in time.  Note that 𝑍௜௧  represent the point impulse response of endogenous 
variables of the panel SVAR. Thus, the model specified in equation (6) is estimated for each point 
impulse response relative to each variable.  To save space, we only report the results of the first 
round (QE1). Tables 4-9 summarize the results. Standard errors clustered by country and corrected 
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are reported in parenthesis.14 The results are robust 
                                                            
14  Note that we do not report the results of the variable of capital requirements because of the problem of 
multicollinearity. Instead, we add two aggregates measures, which are sum of the cumulative of the 9 instruments by 
country and time proposed by Cerutti et al. (2016). The nine instruments include capital requirements, capital buffer 
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across different specifications in Tables 4-9, and the estimated magnitudes of the coefﬁcients are 
quite stable.  
Table 4 summarizes the results of the model specified in equation ሺ6ሻ for the response of 
real credit to a Fed balance sheet shock. Results show that macroeconomic fundamentals (real GDP 
growth and inflation), financial openness (financial integration, capital openness, currency 
exposure, market capitalization), and macroprudential policies (LTV regulations, local and foreign 
reserve requirements and capital controls) seem to drive the responsiveness of real credit to a Fed 
shock. For instance, the responsiveness of real credit is negatively associated with the intensity of 
capital inflow controls. In other words, countries with higher intensity of capital controls tends to 
experience less credit cycle following an unexpected change in the Fed balance sheet. In particular, 
our results also suggest that financial openness play an important role in explaining the 
heterogeneous responses across countries.  
                                                            
(real estate credit), capital buffer (consumer credit), capital buffer (other sector), concentration limit, interbank 
exposure limit, loan-to-value ratio capital, foreign and local reserve requirements. See Table A1 for more exposition.  
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Figure 3. Cross-country distribution of IRFs 
 
Note: Boxplot of country-specific distribution of impulse response functions over a horizon of 5 months.  
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Figure 4. Cross-country distribution of VDs 
 
Note: Boxplot of country-specific distribution of variance decomposition over a horizon of 5 months.  
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Table 4. Determinants of responses of real credit to a Fed balance sheet shock 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations -0.0003*** (0.0000) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0003*** 
( 0.00002) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0000 ) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0000)  
CUM_PRUC 0.0006*** (0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0001)  
CUM_PRUC2 -0.0005*** (0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004***  
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001)  
Foreign res. requirements 0.0012*** (0.0004) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0011***   
(0.0000) 
0.0011*** 
(0.0000)  
Local res. requirements -0.0004*** (0.0000) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0005***  
(0.0000) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0000)  
Foreign currency exposure 0.00004*** (0.0000)   
0.00002** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001** 
(0.0000)  
Financial integration  0.00003*** (0.00001)      
Market cap. to GDP   -0.00001** (0.0000)     
Financial open. 0.0012*** (0.00017) 
0.0012*** 
(0.00018) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0012*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0001)  
Capital controls (overall) -0.0025*** (0.00015) 
-0.0026*** 
(0.00015)    
-0.0021*** 
(0.0003)  
Capital controls (inflows)   -0.0024*** (0.0002)     
Capital controls (outflows)         
-0.0026*** 
(0.0001)    
Inflation      0.00001*** (0.0000)  
GDP growth      0.00002*** (0.0000)  
Credit growth       0.0027  (0.5150 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0097 0.0101 0.0043 0.0038 0.0168 0.0101 0.0020 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of real credit over 5 horizons. 
Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Determinants of responses of long-run government bond to a Fed balance sheet shock 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations 0.0021** (0.0008) 
0.0022* 
(0.0009) 
0.0022**  
(0.0009) 
0.0017  
(0.0013) 
0.0027***  
(0.0004) 
0.0038*** 
(0.0010)  
CUM_PRUC -0.0279*** (0.0067) 
-0.0278*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0278***  
(0.0066) 
-0.0282***  
(0.0072) 
-0.0274***  
(0.0061) 
-0.0261***  
(0.0070)  
CUM_PRUC2 0.0247** (0.0075) 
0.0246** 
(0.0076) 
0.0247**  
(0.0075) 
0.0256**  
(0.0085) 
0.0237***  
(0.0065) 
0.0214**  
(0.0079)  
Foreign res. requirements 0.0333*** (0.0038) 
0.0333*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0333***  
(0.0037) 
0.0329***  
(0.0043) 
0.0338***  
(0.0033) 
0.0345***  
(0.0040)  
Local res. requirements 0.0109*** (0.0021) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0109***  
(0.0021) 
0.0103***  
(0.0016) 
0.0115  
(0.0025) 
0.0123***  
(0.0021)  
Foreign currency exposure 0.0002 (0.0005)   
0.0004  
(0.0006) 
0.000006 
(0.0006) 
-0.00008 
(0.0002)  
Financial integration  0.0002 (0.0004)      
Market cap. to GDP   -0.000008  (0.0000)     
Financial open. 0.0251*** (0.0013) 
0.0250*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0251***  
(0.0013) 
0.0251***  
(0.0014) 
0.0249***  
(0.0012) 
0.0191***  
(0.0026)   
Capital controls (overall) 0.0235 (0.0194) 
0.0234 
(0.0195) 
0.0222  
(0.0206)   
0.0338  
(0.0191)  
Capital controls (inflows)    0.0220  (0.0194)    
Capital controls (outflows)     0.0248  (0.0192)   
Inflation      0.0006***  (0.0001) 
-0.0019** 
(0.0008) 
GDP growth      -0.0007***   (0.0001) 
0.1212** 
(0.0462) 
Credit growth       0.0015*  (0.0007) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0083 0.0087 0.0063 0.0108 0.0056 0.0009 0.0009 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of long-run government bond 
over 5 horizons. Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 6. Determinants of responses of stock market to a Fed balance sheet shock 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations -0.0073***  (0.0006) 
-0.0073***  
(0.0006) 
-0.0072***  
(0.0005) 
-0.0071***  
(0.0008) 
-0.0075***  
(0.0004) 
-0.0083***  
(0.0004)  
CUM_PRUC 0.0026 (0.0039) 
0.0026  
(0.0039) 
0.0025  
(0.0039) 
0.0029  
(0.0042) 
0.0023  
(0.0036) 
0.0022  
(0.0038)  
CUM_PRUC2 0.0013  (0.0044) 
0.0013  
(0.0045) 
0.0013  
(0.0044) 
0.0008 
(0.0050) 
0.0018  
(0.0038) 
0.0024  
(0.0042)  
Foreign res. requirements -0.0025  (0.0022) 
-0.0025  
(0.0022) 
-0.0025  
(0.0022) 
-0.0023  
(0.0025) 
-0.0028  
(0.0019) 
-0.0027  
(0.0022)  
Local res. requirements -0.0053***  (0.0012) 
-0.0053***  
(0.0012) 
-0.0053*** 
( 0.0013) 
-0.0051***  
(0.0010) 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0062***  
(0.0013)  
Foreign currency exposure 0.00007  (0.0001)   
0.000006  
(0.0001) 
0.0001  
(0.0002) 
0.0007  
(0.0004)  
Financial integration  0.0000  (0.0001)      
Market cap. to GDP   -0.000002 (0.0000)     
Financial open. 0.0161***  (0.0027) 
0.0160***  
(0.0026) 
0.0160***  
(0.0026) 
0.0160***  
(0.0026) 
0.0161*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0132***  
(0.0032)  
Capital controls (overall) -0.0081  (0.0112) 
-0.0080 
(0.0113) 
-0.0086  
(0.0118)   
-0.0041  
(0.0085)  
Capital controls (inflows)    -0.0086 (0.0113)    
Capital controls (outflows)     -0.0076 (0.0110)    
Inflation      0.00008  (0.0001)  
GDP growth      0.0002*** (0.0000)  
Credit growth       -0.0145  ( 0.0128) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0084 0.0104 0.0120 0.0096 0.0110 0.0099 0.0085 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of stock market index over 
5 horizons. Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 7. Determinants of responses of exchange rate to a Fed balance sheet shock 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations 0.0002***  (0.0000) 
0.0002***  
(0.00005) 
0.0002***  
(0.00004) 
0.0001***  
 (0.00005) 
0.0002  
(0.0001) 
-0.0002  
(0.0002)  
CUM_PRUC -0.0006*** (0.0000) 
-0.0006***  
(0.0001) 
-0.0006***  
(0.0001) 
-0.0007***  
(0.00007) 
-0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0010***  
(0.0002)  
CUM_PRUC2 0.0002  (0.0001) 
0.0002***  
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.00025* 
(0.00012) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0009** 
(0.0003)  
Foreign res. requirements 0.0029***  (0.00006) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0027***  
(0.00006) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0025***  
(0.0001)  
Local res. requirements 0.0006*** (0.0000) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0007***  
(0.00006) 
0.0006***  
(0.0001) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003*  
(0.0002)  
Foreign currency exposure -0.00004  (0.0000)   
-0.00004  
(0.0001) 
-0.00004  
(0.0001) 
0.0001  
(0.0001)  
Financial integration  -0.00002  (0.0000)      
Market cap. to GDP   0.000001 (0.0000)     
Financial open. -0.0015***  (0.0004) 
-0.0015***  
(0.0004) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015***  
(0.0004) 
-0.0005***  
(0.0010)  
Capital controls (overall) 0.0004  (0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
      
  
-0.0015  
(0.0012)  
Capital controls (inflows)     0.0006*** (0.000)    
Capital controls (outflows)     0.0002  (0.0004)    
Inflation      -0.0001* (0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
GDP growth      0.0002*  (0.0000) 
0.00005 
(0.00003) 
Credit growth       -0.0025  (0.0024) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0666 0.0666 0.0085 0.0754 0.0622 0.0475 0.0004 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of exchange rate over 5 
horizons. Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 8. Determinants of responses of CPI to a Fed balance sheet shock 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations -0.0003***  (0.0001) 
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003***  
( 0.0000) 
-0.0003**  
(0.0001) 
-0.0003***  
(0.0000) 
-0.0004***  
(0.0000)  
CUM_PRUC 0.0003  (0.0005) 
0.0003  
(0.0005) 
0.0003  
(0.0005) 
0.0003  
(0.0006) 
0.0003  
(0.0005) 
0.0003  
(0.0006)  
CUM_PRUC2 -0.0003 (0.0006) 
-0.0002  
(0.0006) 
-0.0002  
(0.0006) 
-0.0003  
(0.0007) 
-0.0002  
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0007)  
Foreign res. requirements 0.0002  (0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003  
(0.0003) 
0.0002  
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0003  
(0.0003)  
Local res. requirements -0.0002  (0.0002) 
-0.0002  
( 0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002  
(0.0002) 
-0.0002  
(0.0002)  
Foreign currency exposure  0.00001  (0.0000)   
0.00004 
(0.0000) 
0.00002  
(0.0000) 
0.00002  
(0.00003)  
Financial integration -0.0010  (0.0015) 
0.000005 
(0.0000)      
Market cap. to GDP    -0.00004  (0.0000)     
Financial open. 0.0007*** (0.0001) 
0.0007***  
(0.0002) 
0.0007*** 
( 0.0002) 
0.0007***  
(0.0002) 
0.0007***  
(0.0002)  
0.0006*  
(0.0003)  
Capital controls (overall) 0.0007  (0.0002) 
-0.0010  
(0.0015) 
-0.0011  
(0.0016)   
-0.0010  
(0.0014)  
Capital controls (inflows)    -0.0010 (0.0016)    
Capital controls (outflows)     -0.0010  (0.0015)   
Inflation      0.00006 (0.0000) 
-0.00001 
(0.0000) 
GDP growth      0.00007 (0.0000) 
0.00001  
(0.0000) 
Credit growth       -0.0016  (0.0014) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0011 0.0010 0.0026 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of CPI over 5 horizons. 
Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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Table 9.  Determinants of responses of real GDP to a Fed balance sheet shock 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
LTV regulations -0.0356***  (0.0045) 
-0.0361***  
(0.0051) 
-0.0357***  
(0.0046) 
-0.0315***  
(0.0069) 
-0.0393***  
(0.0023) 
-0.0311*** 
(0.0056)  
CUM_PRUC 0.0272  (0.0342) 
0.0271  
(0.0343) 
0.0272  
(0.0342) 
0.0324  
(0.0367) 
0.0226  
(0.0317) 
0.0352  
(0.0372)  
CUM_PRUC2 -0.0268  (0.0386) 
-0.0264  
(0.0391) 
-0.0266  
(0.0387) 
-0.0361  
(0.0436) 
-0.0184  
(0.0336) 
-0.0406  
(0.0423)  
Foreign res. requirements 0.0001   (0.0193) 
-0.0001 
(0.0195) 
-0.00002  
( 0.0193) 
0.0049  
(0.0218) 
-0.0043  
(0.0168) 
0.0059  
(0.0211)  
Local res. requirements  -0.0206*  (0.0106) 
-0.0209*  
(0.0105) 
-0.0208*  
(0.0106) 
-0.0169*   
(0.0081) 
-0.0236  
(0.0130) 
-0.0158  
(0.0115)  
Foreign currency exposure -0.0022  (0.0041)   
-0.0033  
(0.0036) 
-0.0013  
(0.0048) 
-0.0010  
(0.0019)  
Financial integration  -0.0014  (-0.1385)      
Market cap. to GDP   0.0001 (0.0001)     
Financial open. 0.1103*** (0.0018) 
0.1110*** 
(0.0018) 
0.1101*** 
(0.0020) 
0.1100*** 
(0.0019) 
0.1106***  
(0.0018) 
0.0659***  
(0.0137)  
Capital controls (overall) -0.1380 (0.1001) 
-0.1385 
(0.1006) 
-0.1254 
(0.1076)   
-0.0649  
(0.1007)  
Capital controls (inflows)    -0.1501 (0.0996)    
Capital controls (outflows)     -0.1242  (0.1022)   
Inflation      0.0035***  (0.0008)  
GDP growth      -0.0029**  (0.0011)  
Credit growth       -0.1862 (0.1964) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Adj. R-squared 0.0377 0.0371 0.0335 0.0301 0.0428 0.0018 0.0005 
Country & time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameter values from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the point estimate response of real GDP over 5 horizons. 
Standard errors clustered by country level, are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.  
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This implies that countries with higher financial openness (Chinn-Ito measure) are more 
affected by the Fed balance sheet policy.  
 Table 5 summarizes the results for long-run government bond yields. It is shown that except 
the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, capital controls and the ratio of total assets and 
liabilities to GDP, the set of categories includes macroeconomic fundamentals (real GDP growth, 
inflation, and real credit growth), financial openness (capital openness and foreign currency 
exposure), and macroprudential policies (LTV regulations, local and foreign reserve requirements) 
are significant in explaining the responsiveness of local long-run government bond yields to a Fed 
balance sheet shock. Table 6 summarizes the results for the response of stock markets to a Fed 
balance sheet shock. We find that LTV regulations, local reserve requirements and financial 
openness (Chinn-Ito measure) are the only set of country-specific variables that robustly explain 
the responses of stock market indexes to a Fed balance sheet shock. For instance, countries with 
higher intensity of either LTV regulation (e.g. India, Indonesia, Korea and Singapore) or local 
reserve requirements (e.g. Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Singapore) are less affected by the 
change in the Fed balance sheet policy.  
Table 7 summarizes the results for exchange rate effects. We find that LTV regulations, local 
and foreign reserve requirements, controls on capital inflows, domestic macroeconomic conditions 
(inflation and real GDP growth) and financial openness (Chinn-Ito measure) play important role 
in explaining the heterogeneous responses of exchange rate to a Fed balance sheet shock. The 
results for financial openness (Chinn-Ito measure) suggest that countries with higher financial 
openness are less affected by changes in Fed balance sheet policy. One would, of course, expect a 
positive sign. We argue that these results may accommodate the fact that countries (e.g. Indonesia, 
Korea and Singapore) with higher financial openness (Chinn-Ito measure) are classified among 
those with higher intensity of LTV regulations and local reserve requirements.  
Finally, Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results for CPI and real GDP, respectively. We find 
that results from column 1 to 7 show that macroprudential instruments that aim at limiting loans to 
residential borrowers play an important role in explaining the responsiveness of prices and real 
GDP to a Fed balance sheet shock. Moreover, the results also show that countries with higher 
financial openness (Chinn-Ito measure) are more affected by the change in the Fed balance policy. 
31 
 
As one would expect, macroeconomic conditions (inflation and real GDP growth) are only 
significant in explaining heterogeneous responses of real GDP (not CPI) to a Fed balance sheet 
shock.  
To summarize, this study provides some evidence that country characteristics and policies 
can affect the extent to which a country responds to Fed balance sheet shocks. In particular, as one 
would expect, stronger intensity of macroprudential regulations, control on capital inflows and 
possibly fewer financial openness, can partially mitigate any cross-border effects of the changes in 
Fed balance sheet policies.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
We examined whether co-movements in the Fed’s balance sheet had spillover effects on the 
selected macro and financial variables of emerging Asian countries. We identified this shock by 
means of a combination of zero and sign restrictions under two identification schemes with either 
total assets or term spread as a policy instrument. We found that a balance sheet shock led to an 
increase in nominal GDP and in CPI. This shock also decreased VIX, meaning a decline in financial 
uncertainty and an increase in investor risk appetite. This pattern is qualitatively similar to what 
one may expect after a positive monetary shock. In addition, under Identification II, we found 
similar results in the responses of GDP, CPI, and VIX. Our findings also accommodate the fact 
that the U.S. long-run rate played an important role in the transmission of the Fed program. Second, 
our findings suggest that the Fed program appear to have spillover effects, but in a heterogeneous 
manner. Finally, we explored the question of this heterogeneity and found that macroeconomic 
fundamentals, financial openness, intensity of capital controls and intensity of macroprudential 
policies explained country heterogeneity in response to Fed balance sheet shocks. In particular, the 
signiﬁcance of these estimates, however, vary across the responsiveness of endogenous variables 
of the panel SVAR.   
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
TABLE A1. Data description and sources 
Variable Description and note Source 
Selected interest rates Effective federal funds rate and 3-month treasury bill Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
US 10-year treasury yield US sovereign bond yields  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Selected assets Selected Assets in millions of dollars Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Securities held outright Securities held outright in billions of dollars Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Term spread Difference between 10-year treasury yield minus 3-month treasury yield 
Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
US GDP Monthly GDP Macroeconomic Advisers 
US CPI, CPE Consumer Price Index FRED 
US total outflows Others investment, equity, direct investment and debt security IMF IFS and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
US stock market indices Stock market in US dollar MSCI 
Output growth Real GDP growth IMF IFS and WDI 
Inflation Year-on-year change in consumer price index IMF IFS and WDI 
Degree of capital account openness KAOPEN index measures the country’s degree of capital account openness Chinn-Ito index 
Market capitalization Market capitalization (%GDP) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
EM Asia 10-year bond Sovereign bond yields MSCI 
Credit growth (%GDP) The private non-financial sector includes non-financial corporates, household, and non-profit institutions (see IMF SNA 2008). BIS 
Real effective exchange rate Real effective exchange rate (period average; 2005=100) BIS 
EM Asia stock market indices Stock market index for each EM Asia (non-adjusted MSCI Emerging Markets Index in US dollar). MSCI 
Note: BIS (Bank for International Settlements), IMF IFS (International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics), MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International), and 
WDI (World Development Indicators). 
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 TABLE A1 (continued).  
Variable Description and note Source 
Capitals control Overall restrictions index (all asset categories) Fernández et al. (2016) 
Control on capital inflows Overall inflow restrictions index (all asset categories) Fernández et al. (2016) 
Control on capital outflows Overall outflow restrictions index (all asset categories) Fernández et al. (2016) 
Capital Regulation, LTV (loan-to-value) 
Regulations, Local Reserve Requirements 
Quarterly indices of the intensity of macroprudential policy regulation 
proxied by cumulated tightening minus cumulated loosening actions 
(2000-2014).  
Cerutti et al. (2016)  
Cum_PruC Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country and time  Cerutti et al. (2016) 
Cum_PruC2 
Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country and time. 
In this case, all individual instruments are adjusted to have maximum and 
minimum changes of 1 and -1. 
Cerutti et al. (2016) 
Foreign Currency Exposure  Foreign currency exposure.  Bénétrix et al. (2015) 
Financial integration Financial integration proxied by the sum of total assets and liabilities as a share of GDP.  Bénétrix et al. (2015) 
Note: We do not report the results of the variable of capital requirements because of its problem of multicollinearity. Instead, we add two aggregates measures, which are sum of 
the cumulative of the 9 instruments by country and time as proposed by Cerutti et al. (2016). The nine instruments include capital requirements, capital buffer (Real estate credit), 
capital buffer (Consumer credit), capital buffer (other sector), concentration limit, interbank exposure limit, loan-to-value ratio capital, foreign and local reserve requirements. See 
Cerutti et al. (2016) for more details.  
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Figure A1. IRFs (Macro block) 
         
Notes: Estimates of the country-specific median impulse response functions for macro block, and the 25th and 75th percentiles as the error bands. The solid black, blue, and 
green lines report the median, 25th, and 75th percentile responses, respectively. The left axes are computed with a scale of 100 points. BS and spread represent the identified 
shocks under Identification I and II, respectively.  
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Figure A2. IRFs (Financial block) 
  
Notes: Estimates of the country-specific median impulse response functions for macro block, and the 25th and 75th percentiles as the error bands. The solid black, 
blue, and green lines report the median, 25th, and 75th percentile responses, respectively. The left axes are computed with a scale of 100 points. BS and spread 
represent the identified shocks under Identification I and II, respectively.  
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Figure A3. VDs (Macro block) 
  
Notes: Estimates of the quantile variance decomposition for macro block, and the 25th and 75th quantiles as the error bands. The solid black, blue, and green lines report the 
median variance and the 25th and 75th quantile bands, respectively. BS and spread represent the identified shocks under Identification I and II, respectively.  
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Figure A4. VDs (Financial variables) 
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APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS FOR PANEL SVAR 
Figure B1. IRFs (Macro block with VIX) 
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Figure B2. VDs (Macro block with VIX) 
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Figure B3. IRFs (Financial block with VIX) 
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Figure B4. VDs (Financial Block with VIX) 
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APPENDIX C. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS FOR THE US SVAR 
 
Figure C1. IRFs (using BBB-AAA corporate bond spread) 
(a) Identification I  
 
(b) Identification II  
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Figure C2. IRFs (using IP) 
(a) Identification I  
 
 
(b) Identification II  
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Figure C3. IRFs (using CPE) 
(a) Identification I  
 
 
(b) Identification II 
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Figure C4. IRFs (using sample period ending in September 2013) 
(a) Identification I  
 
(b) Identification II 
 
 
